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When agencies of communication expanded from one state into
another bringing with them not only tangibles which became
permanently located but tangibles which were movable and which
were moved in and out of a jurisdiction, the methods available
for assessing such property for taxation became inadequate. As
long as the property was permanently located, the difficulty was
not apparent. The ad valorem tax could be applied to tracks,
telegraph wires or stations just as it was applied to other forms
of fixed personalty. But when the property consisted of rail-
road cars which passed back and forth across state boundary
lines, the preliminary problem of finding the situs arose. The ad
valorem tax could only be used when the situs was known. It
involved no means of locating the subject of taxation when that
was not at hand.
While the state could assess specific cars which were at a given
moment in a jurisdiction,' and occasionally did so,2 it ran the risk
that the corporation would have most of its movable property in
other states. The corporation, on the other hand, ran the risk
that an excessively large number of railroad cars might be in the
state at the time a return was required. It seemed, on both hands,
more equitable, therefore, to compute an average of number of
movables which could be used as the basis of assessment.
ALLOCATION OF TANGIBLES
It was, of course, possible to count the number of cars moving
in and out of a state and to compute an average.3 A more con-
venient plan, however, was to value the entire property as a unit
and to apportion a part of it to the taxing jurisdiction by a com-
parison with some constant factor. This method is described in
Pullrma s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsyvanid.4
"The mode which the State of Pennsylvania adopted, to as-
certain the proportion of the company's property upon which it
should be taxed in that State, was by taking as a basis of assess-
ment such.proportion of the capital stock of the company as the
'Pullnan's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania (1891) 141 U. S. 18, 11
Sup. Ct. 876. The question of interstate commerce involved has been 'dis-
cussed in Isaacs, The Federal Protection of Foreign Corporations (1926)
26 CoL. L. Ruv. 263.
2 People ex rel. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad V.
Miller (1906) 202 U. S. 584, 596, 26 Sup. Ct. 714.
3Anerican Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall (1899) 174 U. S. 70, 19 Sup.
Ct. 599; Uiion Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch (1900) 177 U. S. 149, 20
Sup. Ct. 631.
4Supra note 1, at 2&
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number of miles over which it ran cars within the State bore to
the whole number of miles, in that and other States, over which
its cars were run."
In fact, the unit rule was considered even superior to an actual
count. In State Railroad Tax Cases,s where the apportionment
was between counties, the court said:
"It may well be doubted whether any better mode of deter-
mining the value of that portion of the track within any one
county has been devised than to ascertain the value of the whole
road, and apportion the value within the county by its relative
length to the whole."
One of the reasons for the availability of this method is the
simplicity of its application. It really requires only two elements,
first, a constant factor such as mileageO property, or gross re-
ceipts," which can be ascertained both totally and locally, and
second, a valuation of the total property owned, regardless of its
lo~ation. In the case of railroads the length of the road can be
readily ascertained both within a state and throughout the total
length5 With telegraph lines, mileage can also be used as a con-
stant factor.. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart,", it
is said:
"Those decisions clearly establish that a statute of a State, re-
quiring a telegraph company to pay a tax upon its property within
the State, valued at such a proportion of the whole value of its
capi al stock as the length of its lines within the State bears
to the length of all its lines everywhere, deducting a sum equal
to the value of its real estate and machinery subject to local taxa-
tion within the State, is constitutional and valid."
'With still another type of corporation, namely, the express com-
pa-ny, mileage has been considered available for finding the situs
of local property." It is true that there is no continuous physical
element in the case of such a company which can be measured,
buit there is distance covered which can be apportioned almost as
well.
"Where mileage is not available as a constant factor, property
(1875) 92 U. S. 575, 608.
C Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. v. Backuts (1894) 154 U. S. 421, 14 Sup. Ct 1114;
Cle.veland, etc. Ry. v. Backits (1894) 154 U. S. 439, 14 Sup. Ct. 1122.
-Underwood Typewriter Co. r. Chambcriain (1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41
Sup. Ct. 45; Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton v. State Tax Cozmisi0on (1924)
266 JTJ. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82.
c.f. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra note 7.
9 Se'nta Clara, County v. Southcre Pacific R. R. (188G) 118 U. S. "94;
Califo rnmi v. Central Pacific R. R. (18S8) 127 U. S. 1, 3 Sup. Ct 1073;
Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. (1888) 127 U. S. 117, S Sup. Ct. 1037;
Maine v. Grand Trunk R. R. (1891) 142 U. S. 217, 12 Sup. CL. 121;
Columbws Southern Ry. v. Wright (1894) 151 U. S. 470, 14 Sup. Ct. 39G.
1- (189 6) 163 U. S. 1, 18, 16 Sup. Ct. 1054, 1059.
3 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Avditor (1897) 165 U. S. 194, 17
Sup. Ct. 305; rehearing denied (1897) 166 U. S. 185, 17 Sup. Ct. 604.
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may be used. Real and tangible personal property were so em-
ployed in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain.2 In fact,
in the case of corporations which are not agencies of communica-
tion, property is most generally used as the constant factor." It
can be found just as readily as trackage both in its local and
total aspects, and can be used in a proportion to measure a tax.
As the unit rule developed as a means of allocating tangibles
to a taxing jurisdiction, however, certain limitations appeared. In
Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. v. Backus,'4 one of these is referred to.
"It is true, there may be exceptional cases, and the testimony
offered on the trial of this case in the Circuit Court tends to show
that this plaintiff's road is one of such exceptional cases, as for
instance, where the terminal facilities in some large city are of
enormous value, and so give to a mile or two in such city a value
out of all proportion to any similar distance elsewhere along the
line of the road, or where in certain localities the company is
engaged in a) particular kind of business requiring for sole use in
such localities an extra amount of rolling stock."
Such a situation was presented in Fargo v. Hart.Y The Ameri-
can Express Company owned real estate worth nearly two mil-
lion, and personal property worth fifteen and a half million dol-
lars located outside of a taxing jurisdiction and not used in its
business. Neither of these items, the court held, could be included
in an application of the unit rule.
The same principle was applied in Wallace v. Mines.G Under
a statute of North Dakota, the total value of railroads was fixed
by the total value of stocks and bonds and a proportion was as-
sessed in the state on the proportion that the main track mileage
in North Dakota bore to the main track of the whole line. But
the court said on page 69:
"North Dakota is a State of plains, very different from the
other States, and the cost of the roads there was much less than
it was in mountainous regions that the roads had to travers~e.
The State is mainly agricultural. Its markets are outside its
boundaries and most of the distributing centers from which it
purchases also are outside. It naturally follows that the great
and very valuable terminals of the road are in other States. :So
looking only to the physical track the injustice of assuming the
value to be evenly distributed according to main track mileage, is
plain."
The track-mileage method of locating movables was also lim-
ited in Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright 7 to cases where the vkilue
12 Supra note 7.
1" Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson (1922) 258 U. S. 290, 42. Sup.
Ct. 305; Bass, Rateliff and Gretton v. State Tax Commission, supra rnote 7.
14 Supra note 6, at 431.
it (1904) 193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. 498.
16 (1920) 253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435; Cf. Davis 'v. Wallace (1f022) 257
U. S. 478, 42 Sup. Ct. 164.
17 (1919) 249 U. S. 275, 39 Sup. Ct. 276.
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apportioned was approximately the same as would have been ob-
tained by actual count. The Union Tank Line Company had an
average of fifty-seven cars in Georgia on which the tax, if im-
posed on the intrinsic value, would have been $47,310. But when
the property was apportioned by the unit rule the assessment
amounted to $291,196. The challenged assessment the court held
was based on a grossly excessive valuation.
"In the present case the Comptroller General made no effort to
assess according to real value or otherwise than upon the ratio
which miles of railroad in Georgia over which the cars moved
bore to the total mileage so traversed in all States. Real values-
the essential aim-of property within a State cannot be azcer-
tained with even approximate accuracy by such process; the
rule adopted has no necessary relation thereto." (at page 283).
The authority of Pullmat's Palacc Car Co. v. Pe asylvaida"',
was limited to that part of its decision which holds that movables
may be taxed although they are used in interstate commerce, and
was overruled in so far as it was authority for the use of the
unit rule as a means of locating movables in a state.10 That the
application of the rule was upheld at all in the Pullman case was
due to the fact that:
"While the record does not disclose the precise valuations upon
which taxes were computed, enough does appear to show that
they were far below (perhaps not one-third) the actual worth of
a hundred cars," (at page 285).
the average number operated in Pennsylvania. Mr. Justice Pit-
ney, with whom Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Clarke dis-
sented, after quoting the principle adopted in the Puliman case
said in reference to this point:
"I cannot agree that any part of what I have quoted-least of
all the italicized clause which relates to the apportionment of the
tax according to track mileage-was obiter dictum or unnecessary
for the decision. . . The authority of the case cannot
properly be overthrown by showing, even if it could be shown,
that the court might have reached the same result upon some
other ground than that which in truth it adopted as the basis of
its decision." (at page 293).
It is submitted that the Pudliman case need not have been over-
ruled. The possibility for adjustment always existed in an ap-
plication of the unit rule" and had been required at times. -1 In
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart22 a statute of Indiana
took as a basis of valuation of the telegraph company's property
within the state the proportion of the value of its whole capital
is Supra note 1.
-Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts (1923) 203 U. S. 203, .45
Sup. Ct. 477.
20 Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. v. Bacus, supra note 6.
21 Fargo v. Hart, supra note 15.
:2 Supra note 10.
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stock which the length of its lines within the state bore to the
whole length of its lines, but also made it the duty of the State
Board of Tax Commissioners to make such deductions, on 4ccount
of a greater proportional value of the company's property outside
the state, or for any other reason, as to assess its property within
the state at its true cash value. If the tax was based on the true
cash value of the property, including in this a proportion of the
going value, a violation of the due process clause was avoided. "
The reasoning adopted by the majority of the court in the
Union Tank Line case had been suggested the previous year and
rejected in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota.24 In the latter,
also, the unit rule was applied to apportion the value of cars
moving in and out of a state. The court said:
"Because the usual tax rate, if applied to the cash value of the
cars taken separately, would result in an appreciably lower tax,
it is insisted that the tax imposed is in excess of what would be
legitimate as an ordinary tax on the property. But the conten-
tion proceeds on an erroneous assumption. The State is not con-
fined to taxing the cars or to taxing them as separate articles. It
may tax the entire property, tangible and intangible, constituting
the car line as used within its limits, and may tax the same at its
real value as part of a going concern." (at page 455).
The limitation implied in the unit rule which, if observed, ob-
viates the necessity for its rejection, is as follows:
"The record makes it reasonably certain that the property,
valued with reference to its use and what it earns, is worth con-
siderably more than the cash value of the cars taken separately-
enough more to indicate that the tax is not in excess of what
would be legitimate as an ordinary tax on the property taken at
its real or full value." (at page 456).
The Union Tank Line case on the other hand, restricts the
valuation of the cars to what would appear from an actual count.
Without inquiring whether the limitation applied in the Cudahy
Packing Company case was observed, the court rejects the method.
The unit rule, no doubt, is also limited to cases where there is
a unity of use between the component parts of an organization.
The dissenting opinion in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Au-
dito2r,- although not followed, makes this clear.
"The mere ownership, however, by an express company of per-
sonal property within a State presents no case for the application
of a unit rule. What unity can there be between the horses and
wagons of an express company in Ohio with those belonging to the
same company situated in the State of New York? The concep-
tion of the unity of railroad and telegraph lines is necessarily
predicated upon the physical connection of such property. To
apply a rule based upon this condition to the isolated ownership
by an express company of movable property in many States, in
23 Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. v. Backus, supra note 6.
24 (1918) 246 U. S. 450, 38 Sup. Ct. 373.25 Supra note 11, at 250.
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reality declares that a mere metaphysical or intellectual relation
between property situated in one State and property found in
another creates as between such property a close relation for the
purpose of taxation."
If no organic unity exists, allocation is not available. It cannot
be applied to mining,-6 oil -*7 or manufacturing companies,2' be-
cause in the case of these the required unity of use is lacking.
It does appear, however, that the proportion may be used with
reference to manufacturing companies when the business is uni-
tary in its nature. In Bass, Ratclif& and Gretton v. State Tax
Comnmission, 9 the court said:
"So in the present case we are of opinion that, as the Company
carried on the unitary business of manufacturing and selling ale,
in which its profits were earned by a series of transactions begin-
ning with the manufacture in England and ending in sales in New
York and other places-the process of manufacturing resulting
in no profits until it ends in sales-the State was justified in at-
tributing to New York a just proportion of the profits earned by
the Company from such unitary business."
ALLOCATION OF INTANGIBLES
In addition to its primary function of locating the tangible
property of interstate agencies of communication in a state, it is
evident from what has been said that the unit rule also performs
a secondary function in allocating the value over and above the
intrinsic worth of tangibles, namely, the value that arises from
the use of property by a going concern. In Uzion Tazk Li iz c.
Wright 3 the dissenting opinion refers to the fact that the cor-
porate excess will not be taxed if the unit rule is rejected when-
ever the valuation it gives rise to exceeds the intrinsic worth.
The incidental apportionment of the excess value was recog-
nized very early, although the first uses of allocation were not
necessarily designed to reach it.- In State Railroad Tax Ca.mxs -
the court asked why bondholders do not sell the tangible property
of railroads as tangibles only:
"The reason is too clear to escape observation. It is because in
the case of the railroad there is attached to all this property, and
goes with it, a privilege, a right to use it through the whole extent
of the richest counties of Illinois, in transporting persons and
property, in a manner which adds immensely to its value when
26 American Bauxite Co. v. Board of Equalizatiou (1915) 119 Ark. .G2,
177 S. W. 1151.
, Standard Oil Co. v. Howe (1919, C. C. A. 9th) 257 Fed. 481.
2s Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chambcrlain, iupra note 7; Hump Hair-
pin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson., supra note 13.
29 Supra note 7, at 282.
3o Supra note 17.
31 The Delaware Railroad Tax (1873, U. S.) 18 Wall. 206; Eric Railroad
Co. v. Pennsylvania (1874, U. S.) 21 Wall. 492.
Z.Svpra note 5, at 606.
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considered as so much iron, so much land, and so much personal
property."
This value the court calls a franchise. But in Cleveland, etc.
Ry. v. Backus-3 the nature of the excess value is recognized as
arising not so much from a franchise as from tangible property
itself.34 It arises from the use of tangibles by a going concern.
"The true value of a line of railroad is something more than an
aggregation of the values of separate parts of it, operated separ-
ately. It is the aggregate of those values plus that arising from
a connected operation of the whole, and each part of the road con-
tributes not merely the value arising from its independent opera-
tion, but its mileage proportion of that flowing from a continuous
and connected operation of the whole. This is no denial of the
mathematical proposition that the whole is equal to the sum of
all its parts, because there is a value created by and resulting from
the combined operation of all its parts as one continuous line.
This is something which does not exist, and cannot exist, until the
combination is formed." sr
That this excess value arises from interstate commerce and
that the unit rule not only does not eliminate it but even includes
it is evident. But its origin in interstate commerce does not
require its subtraction.
"It comes rather within that large class of state action, like cer-
tain police restraints, which, while indirectly affecting, cannot be
considered as a regulation of interstate commerce, or a direct bur-
den upon its free exercise." 36
When the unit rule was used in the cases we have considered to
allocate the value of intangibles to a state, the excess value was
incidental, in that physical property was in all cases the predomi-
nant basis of the assessment. The excess arose because the real
was often more than the intrinsic worth.37 In Adams Express
Co. v. Ohio State Auditor s however, this condition was reversed.
The physical property of express companies in Ohio was negligible
compared to the intangible property. For 1895, returns of $42,-
065, $23,430 and $28,438 of three express companies gave rise
to an assessed valuation of $533,095, $499,373.60 and $488,264.70
respectively. The question arose whether the predominant corpo-
rate excess was a different kind of property from the incidental
corporate excess which develops from a large physical investment
used as a going concern. A strong dissenting opinion by Mr.
33Supra notd 6.
34Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Greene (1917) 244 U. S. 522, 545, 37
Sup. Ct. 683.
3"Cleveland, etc. Ry. v. Backus, supra note 6, at 444, 14 Sup. Ct., at 1123.
36 Ibid. at 447.
3'Branson v. Bush (1919) 251 U. S. 182, 40 Sup. Ct. 113.
S Supra note 11.
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Justice White, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Field, Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brown, held it was :3
"It cannot, I submit, be asserted with reason that the nearly
four millions of excess on the assessment of the tangible propert ,
laid by the state board resulted from assessing only the actual
intrinsic value of such property, since to so contelid would be
beyond all reason. ."
The majority, however, held that there was no difference in the
nature of the excess.40
"No more reason is perceived for limiting the valuation of the
property of express companies to horses, wagons and furniture,
than that of railroad, telegraph and sleeping car companies, to
roadbed, rails and ties; poles and wires; or cars. The unit is
a unit of use and management, and the horses, wagons, safes,
pouches and furniture; the contracts for transportation facili-
ties; the capital necessary to carry on the business, whether rep-
resented in tangible or intangible property, in Ohio, possessed a
value in combination and from use in connection with the property
and capital elsewhere, which could as rightfully be recognized in
the assessment for taxation in the instance of these companies as
the others."
Nor does the fact that the intangible element exceeds the tangible
exempt the former from taxation.-"
"Now, whenever separate articles of tangible property arejoined together, not simply by a unity of ownership, but in a
unity of use, there is not infrequently developed a property, in-
tangible though it may be, which in value exceeds the aggregate
of the value of the separate pieces of tangible property. Upon
what theory of substantial right can it be adjudged that the
value of this intangible property must be excluded from the tax
lists, and the only property placed thereon be the separate pieces
of tangible property ?"
The real problem was to find the location of the corporate
excess. Was it located at the domicile of the owner as the dis-
senting opinion maintained? -12 Or was it located in the various
states where business was done?,,
"Where is the situs of this intangible property? Is it simply
where its home office is, where is found the central directing
thought which controls the workings of the great machine, or in
the State which gave it its corporate franchise; or is that in-
tangible property distributed wherever its tangible property is
located and its work is done? Clearly, as we think, the latter.
Every State within which it is transacting business and where it
has its property, more or less, may rightfully say that the $16,-
000,000 of value which it possesses springs not merely from the
original grant of corporate power by the State which incorporated
9 Ibid. at 237, 17 Sup. Ct, at 315.
40 Ibid. at 221, 17 Sup. Ct., at 309.
41 (1897) 166 U. S., at 219, 17 Sup. Ct., at 605.
42 (1897) '165 U. S., at 250, 17 Sup. Ct., at 320.
43 Supr7-fote 41, at 223, 17 Sup. Ct., at 607.
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it, or frzom the mere ownership of the tangible property, but it
springs from the fact that that tangible property it has combined
with contracts, franchises, and privileges into a single unit of
property; and this State contributes to that aggregate value not
merely the separate value of such tangible property as is within
its limits, but its proportionate share of the value of the entire
property. That this is true is obvious from the result that would
follow if all the States other than the one which created the cor-
poration could and should withhold from it the right to transact
express business within their limits. It might continue to own
all its tangible property within each of those States, but unable
to transact the express business within their limits, that $12,000,-
000 of value attributable to its intangible property would shrivel
to a mere trifle."
The court in the Adams Express Company case has again limi-
ted the rule mobilia sequuntur personam. In Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky4 tangibles were removed from its effect,
and it was limited to intangibles. In the Adams Express Company
case, the corporate excess was removed from its scope.4'
As a result of the decision in the Adams Express Company case,
it was considered that the corporate excess not only need not be
deducted from a valuation but could be taxed separately as other
property. It could even be assessed separately and independently
of its physical basis. Under the heading of "all other property"
the corporate excess was found in St. Louis & E. St. L. Elec. Ry.
v. Hagerman,4 by a valuation of the entire property of a railroad
in the state, and by a deduction from this total of the value of all
tangible property. The tangible and intangible values of a rail-
road were also assessed separately in Baker v. Druesedow? in
that the value of the former was determined by county officials
and the value of the latter by the State Tax Board. Thereupon
the two were added together and an ad valorem tax imposed upon
the aggregate.
It is, of course, difficult to reconcile the recent decision in
Union Tank Line v. Wright48 with the Adams Express Compazy
case. In the Union Tank Line case the court limited the valuation
of the corporate excess rather closely to the value of the physical
property. With an express company it is not possible to do this.
ALLOCATION OF THE MEASURE
Up to this point we have considered the allocation of the inci-
dence of a tax. It has not generally been recognized that the unit
44 (1905), 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36.
45 Supra note 41, at 224, 17 Sup. Ct., at 607. Credits are still taxable at
the domicile of the owner. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louistyille
(1917) 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40.
46 (1921) 256 U. S. 314, 41 Sup. Ct. 488.
47 (1923) 263 U. S. 137, 44 Sup. Ct. 40.
48 Supra note 17.
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rule may also be used, and is at times used, to apportion the
measure.'O In some of the cases the incidence only is allocated; in
others, the measure only, but in many, both.
The double function of the unit rule which is performed directly
and therefore obscurely when a tax is imposed on property pro-
portioned on the mileage basis and is measured by tangibles, is
made clear when the measure is separated from the incidence
and is made some factor such as gross receipts, capital stock or
income. For instance, the unit rule was used to locate tangibles
in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts.3 The measure
was capital stock proportioned to the mileage.
total mileage total capital stock
local mileage (x) local capital stock
But the tax was neither on mileage nor on capital stock but on
property. It is, therefore, apparent that the mileage basis in
this proportion is used to allocate not merely the property; but
there are two proportions implied in the one above, the first
to allocate the taxable property and the second the measure.
(1) total mileage total property
local mileage (x) local property
(2) total property total capital stock
local property (x) local capital stock
The contrast between the simple proportion and the double one
is found in Uaderwood Typewriter Co. v,. Czambcrlah2.-" When
income was derived from the use of tangibles the local taxable
income was found by being proportioned to the whole net income
in the ratio which the fair cash value of the real and tangible
personal property within the state bore to the fair cash value
of all the real and tangible personal property. That is:
total property total income
local property (x) local income
This proportion did not allocate the local property, because that
was known. No mileage or other intermediary was necessary. -
When, on the other hand, the property of the corporation con-
sisted of intangibles, gross receipts were used to allocate it to
the state:
total gross receipts total income
local gross receipts (x) local income
-' For discussion of incidence and measure sce Flint v. Stoize Tiacy Co.
(1911) 220 U. S. 107, 165, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 355; Kansas City, F. S. and 2.
Ry. v. Botkin (1916) 240 U. S. 227, 232, 36 Sup. Ct. 261, 262.
30 (1888) 125 U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. 961.
z'SSupra note 7.




But since the tax was on property, not on gross receipts, there
are two proportions implied in the above.
(1) total gross receipts total property
local gross receipts (x) local property
(2) total property total income
local property (x) local income
The same double proportion is found in Pullman Co. v. Richard-
son 3 where the tax is measured by gross receipts but the inter-
mediary factor is mileage.
Where property is taxed on an ad valorem basis the incidence
only need be located by the unit rule. Frequently, of course, the
measure is also allocated indirectly in that the subject matter ap-
portioned by the unit rule is also used as the measure of the tax.
We find this in Cleveland, etc. Ry. v. Backus14 where property
was apportioned to a state on a mileage basis and assessed by an
ad valorem tax.
The measure alone may be allocated in various ways. Where
a tax is on local property and this is a known quantity the unit
rule, if used, can apportion only the measure. In United States
Glue Co. v. Oak Creek,5 5 income was apportioned by a formula
under which the gross business in dollars of the corporation in
the state, added to the value in dollars of its property in the state
was made the numerator of a fraction of which the denominator
consisted of the total gross business in dollars of the corporation,
both within and without the state, added to the value in dollars
of its property, wherever located. This fraction was taken as
representing that portion of the income which was deemed to be
derived from business transacted and property located within the
state. Since in the formula itself local business and property
were used and since only local business and property could be
taxed, the unit rule had no function to perform except to appor-
tion the measure.
The same observations apply to a franchise which may be
either allocated" or found by some other means. In St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. v. Arkansas" the measure was based upon a
proportion of the outstanding capital stock of the corporation
represented by property owned and used in business transacted in
a state. No doubt it was the limitation of the standard that led
53 (1923) 261 U. S. 330, 43 Sup. Ct. 366; Maine v. Grand Trunk R. R.,
supra, note 9.
54 Supra note 6.
55 (1918) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499.
56 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Gottlieb (1903) 190 U. S. 412, 23 Sup.
Ct. 730; Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Greene, supra. note 34; St. Louia
& E. St. L. Elec. Ry. v. Hagerman, supra note 46.
55 (1914) 235 U. S. 350, 35 Sup. Ct. 99.
THE UNIT RULE
the court to hold that the incidence, the franchise, was confined
to the state,
"the amount of the tax being fixed solely by reference to the
property of the corporation that is within the State and used in
business transacted within the State, and excluding any imposi-
tion upon or interference with interstate commerce. By this we
understand that the franchise of a foreign corporation that is
intended to be taxed is that which relates solely to intra-state
business. . . " (at page 363).
In all of these cases it is assumed by the court that the measure
of the property tax, whether it be tangibles, capital stock, gross
receipts or income, must be proportioned as well as the incidence.
Of course, the incidence must be localized to avoid a deprivation
of property without due process of law. It may also be true that
a tax falling on property located outside a state interferes with
interstate commerce. But whether, in addition, the measure of
a property tax must be limited presents a different question.
In PulIman Co. v. Riclzardsoies it seems to be recognized that
a property tax measured by standards made up of external fac-
tors, at least in the case of property which is part of a going
concern, will not violate the "commerce" clause.
"In taxing property so situated and used a State may select
and employ any appropriate means of reaching its actual or full
value as part of a going concern,-such as treating the gross
receipts from its use in both intra-state and interstate commerce
as an index or measure of its value,-and if the means do not in-
volve any discrimination against interstate commerce and the tax
amounts to no more than what would be legitimate as an ordinaiy
tax upon the property, valued with reference to its use, the tax
is not open to attack as restraining or burdening such commerce."
(at page 338).
If the incidence of a tax may fall on property used in interstate
commerce,59 certainly the measure where the effect is more in-
direct can include such commercecO
Perhaps the same observations may be made as to the measure
of a tax on local property under the "due process" clause. In
Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts,rl it is said:
"So, if the tax is, as we hold it to be, levied upon a legitimate
subject of such taxation, it is not void because imposed upon
property beyond the State's jurisdiction, for the property itself
is not taxed. In so far as it is represented in the authorized
5sSupra, note 53; Schwab v. Richardson (1923) 263 U. S. 88, 44 Sup.
Ct. 60.
59 Cleveland, etc. Ry. v. Back s, supra note 6.
Go In State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 284,
the court held a tax on gross receipts was a tax on the receipts after they
had become mingled with other property in the state. If this case be
construed as permitting a tax on local property measured by groes receipts
we have a case where the measure of a property tax was not allocated.
01 (1913) 231 U. S. 63, 87, 34 Sup. Ct. 15, 19.
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capital stock it is used only as a measure of taxation, and, as
we have seen, such measure may be found in property or in the
receipts from property not in themselves taxable."
It is not impossible that the measure of a property tax must be
proportioned under the "due process" clause,0 2 although the meas-
ure of a tax on a franchise as property can include elements not
themselves taxable. 3  Nevertheless, the measure of a property
tax has practically always been proportioned. Possibly this was
done to avoid some constitutional objection which might arise;
possibly it was simply the result of custom; or what is more
likely, it was never recognized what was being done.
EXCISE TAXES
In general the unit rule has not been used to localize either
the incidence or the measure of a business tax. Of course the
incidence must be of local business-if not interstate commerce
is burdened,"4 but the method of locating it within a state has
heretofore been largely geographical.
It has always been held, on the other hand, that the measure
of an excise tax need not be proportioned at all. This rule follows
from the principle that an excise tax may be measured by ele-
ments themselves not taxable, probably because a tax on business
is a tax on activity rather than property and does not come in
conflict with the "due process" clause. A tax on local business
is not invalid although measured by capital stock representing
property located outside the state,6 or gross receipts arising from
interstate commerce.00 In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,"7 it is said:
"It is therefore well settled by the decisions of this court that
when the sovereign authority has exercised the right to tax a
legitimate subject of taxation as an exercise of a franchise or
privilege, it is no objection that the measure of taxation is found
in the income produced in part from property which of itself
considered is non-taxable."
In other words, it appears that the unit rule has no application
either to the incidence or measure of a tax on business.
60Cf. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Pennsylvania (1905) 198 U. S. 341,
25 Sup. Ct. 669. This subject will be discussed more fully in a paper on
classification of corporate taxes.
63 Cf. Home Insurance Co. v. New York (1890) 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup.
Ct. 593.
64State Freight Tax Case (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 232; Philadelphia and
Southern S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania (1887) 122 U. S. 326, 7 Sup. Ct. 1118;
Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co. (1903) 191 U. S. 171, 24 Sup. Ct. 39.
-
5Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York (1892) 143 U. S. 305, 12 Sup.
Ct. 403.
66 People ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer (1915) 235 U. S. 549,
35 Sup. Ct. 162.
07 Loc. cit. supra note 49.
THE UNIT RULE
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansaw/ and Pullman Co.
v. Kansas,- however, it was held that an unlimited measure
renders a tax on concededly local business an interference with
the "due process" and "commerce" clauses. We have traced else-
where-0 the vicissitudes of an excise tax measured by factors
which include interstate commerce. A tax on local business
measured by total capital stock was held valid in the case of an
industrial corporation,-' invalid in the case of an agency of com-
munication,72 and finally invalid also as to an industrial com-
pany.- The reason for these changes was the gradual recognition
of the economic connection existing between the local and inter-
state business of organizations engaged in both types of com-
merce, and the incorporation of the effect of the relation into the
law by the unconstitutional condition." It is true that the eco-
nomic connection always existed in fact, but it had not been
recognized in law. When a state required a foreign corporation
to waive the connection by an antecedent agreement, however,
the dignity of the Constitution was violated, and under the con-
struction of the courts, due process and interstate commerce were
interfered with."
In the Western Union case, however, the court seems to as-
sume that the interference arises not because of the economic
connection between the local and interstate incidences but by
reason of the unrestricted measure.
"Looking, then, at the natural and reasonable effect of the
statute, disregarding mere forms of expression, it is clear that
the making of the payment by the Telegraph Company, as a
charter fee, of a given per cent of its authorized capital, repre-
senting, as that capital clearly does, all of its business and prop-
erty, both within and outside of the State, a condition of its right
to do local business in Kansas, is, in its essence, not simply a
tax for the privilege of doing local business in the State, but a
burden and tax on the company's interstate business and on its
property located or used outside of the State." ,
Whether the tax in the Western Union case would have been
restricted to local business if the unit rule had been used to
apportion the measure, capital stock, does not appear. It is true
where both the incidence and measure of an excise tax are limited
to a state in that local property is used to measure the value of
(1910) 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 190.
0 (1910) 216 U. S. 56, 30 Sup. Ct. 232.
7 Isaacs, The Federal Protection of Foreign Corporatio2s (1926) 26
CoL. L. REv. 263.
7 Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, supra note 65.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, supra note 6S.
73Looney v. Crane Co. (1917) 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 85.
,4 Op. Cit. supra note 70.
Op. cit. supra note 70, at 281.
7 Supra note 68, at 30, 30 Sup. Ct., at 198.
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local business, the tax is valid. 7 But does it follow that the
apportionment of the measure to a state by the unit rule dis-
solves the economic connection which may exist between local
and interstate commerce? This view represents a considerable
departure from accepted ideas. An unrestricted measure was
never held to widen the incidence of a tax, nor a restricted meas-
ure to narrow it. This proposition was submitted for possibly
the first time in the Western Union case. Even in the application
of the "due process" clause under which the unit rule is peculiarly
applicable, it is doubtful if apportionment of the measure sepa-
rates an economic connection between local and external property.
The conclusion which seems warranted by the Western Union
case, however, was applied in Oklahoma v. Wells, Fargo and
Co.,78 namely, that an apportionment of the measure of an ex-
cise tax to a state would localize the incidence. The statute pro-
vided:
. . . if such public service corporation operates partly
within and partly without the state, it shall pay tax equal to such
proportion of said per centum of its gross receipts as the portion
of its business done within the state bears to the whole of its
business." (at page 299).
No other method was provided in this case for finding local busi-
ness. The court held, however, that the tax was invalid as being
on interstate commerce.
The apportionment of the measure of an excise tax, therefore,
cannot make interstate business local. This was recently pointed
out in Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts.70
"Here also the excise was demanded on account of interstate
business. A new method for measuring the tax had been pre-
scribed, but that cannot save the exaction. . . . The intro-
duction of an extremely complicated method for calculating the
amount . . . does not change its nature or mitigate the
burden."
In brief, the unit rule may be used as a convenient method
for allocating to a taxing jurisdiction the local property of a cor-
poration which is engaged in a unitary business, and which owns
property in more than one jurisdiction. It is particularly avail-
able for this purpose when intangibles form the incidence of a
tax. For localizing business, however, the value of the method
is doubtful. In any event, business will not be localized by an
apportionment of the measure of a tax.
7 Southesm Railway Co. v. Watts (1923) 260 U. S. 519, 43 Sup. Ct. 192.
78 (1912) 223 U. S. 298, 32 Sup. Ct. 218.
79 Supra note 19, at 217, 219, 45 Sup. Ct., at 480.
